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AUKUS and the EU: A Snub for the Bloc?
 
The most surprising thing about AUKUS, the upgraded defence partnership between
Australia, the UK, and the US, is the EU reaction. The Presidents of the Commission and the
European Council have sharply condemned what they see as a snub for the Union, not just for
France.
That means they think of the EU as an integrated strategic player. Which is, indeed, the only
way for Europeans to have any in�uence in world politics. But in reality it is not an integrated
player yet, of course. When France makes a deal to sell submarines to Australia, or deploys its
Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier to Asia, those are French decisions, which are at best
implicitly related to a broader EU policy. The same applies to other Member States. That is
why the indignation about AUKUS and its immediate consequence, Australia breaking its
contract for French submarines, is far from equally shared across the EU.
There are promising developments, such as the new tool of “coordinated maritime presence”,
allowing for voluntary coordination between Member States that deploy ships (and aircraft)
to a speci�c area, while these forces remain under national command. And just last week the
EU unveiled a new Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Paci�c. Fundamentally, however,
most Member States continue to regard EU foreign and security policy as no more than one
way among others to complement their national policies. There is no single EU policy or
strategy.
That said, the manner in which France was, it seems, purposely deceived, is unbecoming the
three AUKUS partners. Needlessly adding insult to injury, that was a grave mistake, and Paris
is right to be upset. And whether Australia’s choice to become a non-nuclear weapon state
Nous utilisons des cookies pour une meilleure expérience utilisateur : certains ne peuvent être désactivés. En utilisant ce site, vous
acceptez notre utilisation de cookies conformément à notre  et à notre
. Si vous n’êtes pas d’accord, merci de ne pas poursuivre sur ce site.
Plus d’information J’accepte
politique des Cookies (/cookies-policy/)  politique de
con�dentialité (/privacy-policy/)
AUKUS and the EU: A Snub for the Bloc? - Egmont Institute https://www.egmontinstitute.be/aukus-and-the-eu-a-snub-for-the-bloc/
2 of 4 9/27/2021, 1:17 PM
with nuclear-powered submarines will reduce tensions and improve security in the region is
questionable. But that the US and Australia deepen their alliance is hardly surprising, in view
of the recent evolution of Canberra’s strategy. Nor is it unexpected that the US feels no need
to consult with its European allies other than the UK (though Britain’s participation in AUKUS
has a strong feeling of post-imperial symbolism).
Europeans must understand that Asia comes �rst now in American strategy, and that
Washington will only take their views into account when they act as a bloc (as they do on
many geo-economic issues). Europeans should not get carried away, therefore. If Brussels
now decides to attach real consequences to the AUKUS incident, such as postponing the start
of the new Trade and Technology Council with the US or the free trade agreement with
Australia, that is a strong signal that the Union expects to be taken seriously as a bloc by its
allies and partners.
But escalating the row only serves the interests of China. Fortunately (at least from this
perspective), Beijing seems to disregard the EU as a strategic player, and misses every
opportunity to improve relations and thus potentially drive a little wedge between Brussels
and Washington. The recent Chinese refusal to have the German frigate Bayern visit Shanghai
on its tour of Asia is a case in point.
Most importantly, a strong EU signal only really makes sense if from now on the EU then also
behaves as a bloc, and Member States stop making purely unilateral decisions about troop
deployments and arms exports as well as major diplomatic initiatives. Then the EU could �nd a
role of its own, as an independent strategic player at the same level as the US, China, and
Russia, with its own grand strategy. This may not seem very likely, but perhaps the current
crisis could be used as a lever to that end. France surely is best placed to take an initiative in
this direction.
 
Prof. Dr. Sven Biscop, director of the Europe in the World programme at the Egmont – Royal
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